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Abstract: The International Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Empirical Study is a comparative 
benchmark of the prediction of HRA methods to the performance of nuclear power plant crews in a 
control room simulator.  There are a number of unique aspects to the present study that distinguish it 
from previous HRA benchmarks, most notably the emphasis on a method-to-data comparison instead 
of a method-to-method comparison.  This paper reviews seven lessons learned about HRA 
benchmarking from conducting the study: (1) the dual purposes of the study afforded by joining 
another HRA study; (2) the importance of comparing not only quantitative but also qualitative aspects 
of HRA; (3) consideration of both negative and positive drivers on crew performance; (4) a relatively 
large sample size of crews; (5) the use of multiple methods and scenarios to provide a well-rounded 
view of HRA performance; (6) the importance of clearly defined human failure events; and (7) the use 
of a common comparison language to “translate” the results of different HRA methods.  These seven 
lessons learned highlight how the present study can serve as a useful template for future benchmarking 
studies. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.  Background 
 
Since the advent of a Technique for Human Error Prediction (THERP) for nuclear power applications 
in 1983 [1], there has been continuous development and refinement of methods in human reliability 
analysis (HRA).  A recent survey [2] suggests there may now be as many as 72 HRA methods in 
various guises, although the number of fully implemented and used methods is estimated to be around 
35. Of these, the number frequently used, especially in the nuclear industry, is considerably smaller.  
HRA methods differ along a number of dimensions, including their scope, underlying model, 
underlying data, and approach to quantification [3].  HRA methods have been further classified 
according to first and second generation [4-7]; task-, time-, or context-related [8]; or atomistic and 
holistic [9]. 
 
Because of the wide variety of HRA methods, it is important to compare them to determine their 
overlap and differences, especially in terms of their analysis outcomes.  A number of expert 
comparisons have been conducted that evaluate HRA methods according to subjective criteria [2-3, 
10-12], but there have been very few actual HRA benchmark activities that have compared the outputs 
of various HRA methods. A benchmark in conventional language use requires a reference or standard 
to which something can be compared. Benchmarking in the present context refers both to comparing 
HRA methods to each other and to an objective empirical reference such as operating crew 
performance in a nuclear power plant simulator. Thus, HRA benchmarking can involve both the 
validation of method predictions against standard performance (i.e., do the methods make accurate 
                                                
*Address correspondence to Ronald Laurids Boring, PhD, Human Factors, Controls, and Statistics Department, 
Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho Falls, ID 83415, USA.  Email: ronald.boring@inl.gov. 
predictions?) and against each other in terms of their ability to accurately predict and explain the basis 
for their predictions (i.e., how do the methods compare to one another?). 
 
A recent literature review [13] discusses the HRA benchmarks that have been conducted to date, 
including: 
 
• The large-scale Human Factors Reliability Benchmark Exercise (HF-REB) [14] conducted at the 
Joint Research Center of the European Commission in Ispra, Italy, in the late 1980s, focusing on 
three nuclear power plant scenarios. 
• Zimolong’s [15] study to validate three HRA method predictions against actual human 
performance on a simulated batch manufacturing scenario. 
• Kirwan’s [16-18] benchmark of 30 analysts applying three HRA methods widely used in the 
British nuclear industry. 
• Maguire’s [19] extensive validation of predictions by one HRA method to operational data from 
aviation. 
 
The review of previous HRA benchmarks [13] highlights a number of lessons learned. In the case of 
the validation benchmarks, the emphasis was on comparing the HRA method predictions to empirical 
data.  In other cases, the emphasis was on a method-to-method benchmark, in which method results 
were compared to each other but not to an external standard.   The previous benchmark studies showed 
that there was considerable variability in HRA method predictions.  This variability can be attributed 
to variability in the application of individual methods or to the ability of the methods to handle a wide 
variety of scenarios. Variability in the application of individual methods can be attributed to a lack of 
clear definition or understanding of the scenario being analyzed—a byproduct of the benchmark study 
design.  Additionally, previous benchmarks focused heavily on one aspect of the analysis—the 
quantitative output produced by the application of the method.  Additional insights into the process 
behind the analysis—including key assumptions made for the qualitative side of HRA—would have 
been useful for explaining possible sources of variability. 
 
Another important lesson learned from earlier studies concerns the infrequent nature of error in skilled 
performance.  For those studies involving empirical operator data, it becomes important to 
acknowledge this low frequency and compensate either with a large number of participants for 
between-subject study designs or a large number of test runs for within-subject study designs.  If such 
manipulations are impractical, it is possible in many cases to seed error-prone behavior, e.g., by 
increasing the workload or task complexity.  Such error seeding must be carefully controlled so as to 
avoid confounds or artificiality, but challenging situations can and do occur in most human operated 
systems. 
 
1.2.  The International HRA Empirical Study 
 
Since the last large-scale HRA benchmark at Ispa [14], a considerable number of new HRA methods 
has been developed, and HRA has grown in its application both within and outside the nuclear 
industry.  Moreover, the Ispra HF-RBE consisted of a method-to-method comparison, while empirical 
validation benchmark studies [15, 19] have generated an interest to translate the method-to-data 
approach into a larger scale study.  Consequently, an international group of HRA researchers, led by 
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) Halden Reactor Project, formulated a new HRA benchmark called the 
“International HRA Empirical Study” [20-22].  This study was designed to build upon earlier HRA 
benchmark efforts, specifically by looking at both qualitative and quantitative analyses, holding 
constant the information provided to different analysis teams, providing information about (but not 
direct access to) the crews in the study, using performance shaping factors to allow comparison of 
degraded but not outright failed operator performance, and providing a common template to allow 
ready comparison of predictions across methods and from methods to empirical data [23]. 
 
Figure 1 depicts the design of the International HRA Empirical Study.  Fourteen nuclear power plant 
(NPP) crews participated in the study at the Halden huMan-Machine Laboratory (HAMMLAB), a full-
scope NPP control room simulator.  These crews consisted of a licensed reactor operator, an assistant 
reactor/turbine operator, and a shift supervisor.  Each crew participated in two simulated scenarios—a 
steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) and a loss of feedwater (LOFW) incident.  Both scenarios had a 
simple (or base) case that closely approximated how such an incident might be trained for during 
routine simulator training.  In addition, both scenarios had a complex case, in which the familiar 
SGTR or LOFW scenario was complicated by secondary malfunctions.  Crew performance was 
observed and documented during these scenario runs in the simulator.  The crew performance 
documentation consisted primarily of a standardized set of drivers based on the performance shaping 
factors in NUREG-1792 [24], short operational summaries of the crew actions, and the success or 
failure of the crews to complete specific actions, sometimes within a predefined time window.  The 
specific actions corresponded to human failure events (HFEs) that are defined in probabilistic risk 







Figure 1:  The Design of the International HRA Empirical Study 
 
 
Fourteen HRAs applied with 13 different HRA methods were completed (one method was used by 
two analysis teams), each generating unique drivers, operational stories, and human error probabilities 
(HEPs).  The outputs produced by the teams were comparable to the performance documented for the 
HAMMLAB crews, thus allowing a direct comparison between the empirical data and the predicted 
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tasks within a specified time as expected by their training.  This performance criterion alone is not standard in 
PRAs, which define an HFE as a failure of a function, system, or component that is the result of human actions 
or inactions [25].  The additional time criterion was included based on trainer expectations of good performance 
in order to define HFEs that might challenge crews and increase the probability of failure. 
HRA data by the assessment team.  Note that because the crews had highly reliable performance in 
most cases [23], it was not always possible to generate failure rates directly from the crew 
performance data.  As such, the benchmark focused more on comparing qualitative data (i.e., the 
drivers and the operational stories) than quantitative data (i.e., the actual crew failure rates vs. the 
methods’ predicted HEPs).   
 
2.  Lessons Learned 
 
The International HRA Empirical Study featured a number of important lessons learned about 
conducting a benchmarking activity.  The careful design of the study as a benchmark was key to 
ensuring HRA methods were effectively evaluated against actual performance and compared on 
meaningful criteria.  The following sections highlight seven of the most significant lessons learned 
about HRA method benchmarking from the study.  Additional lessons learned about the HRA methods 
themselves can be found in the companion piece, [26]. 
 
2.1. Study Design Issues 
 
The International HRA Empirical Study was merged with another HRA study at the HAMMLAB 
[27].  The objective of that study was to manipulate the complexity of the tasks performed by control 
room crews, thus allowing a direct comparison of crew performance on simple vs. complex tasks.  
Early in the task complexity study design process, many persons who later joined the benchmark 
assessment group met with the HAMMLAB group in order to discuss scenarios. The purpose was to 
ensure that the HAMMLAB study used PRA relevant scenarios and in general was fit for HRA  
purposes. Based on these considerations, we knew that these scenarios were also a good fit for HRA 
benchmarking purposes. Because the overall study was a merger of task complexity and benchmarking 
objectives, it can be seen as a successful dual-purpose study. 
 
An advantage of the dual-purpose study is that it eliminated many of the barriers to running a 
standalone benchmarking study.  Foremost among these barriers are the resources required to support 
dedicated simulator runs in addition to organizing analysis teams to perform the HRAs.  By merging 
the benchmark with the task complexity study, resources were optimized.   
 
In the benchmark study, separate groups were organized to perform respective tasks: 
 
• The HAMMLAB group was responsible for designing and conducting the empirical data part of 
the study, including observing and summarizing the crew performance. 
• Independent analysis teams performed HRAs on the scenarios to predict crew performance. 
• The HRA assessment team was responsible for comparing the actual crew performance findings to 
the HRA predictions. 
 
The activities were separated, facilitating a true “blind” comparison of the findings with the 
predictions.  HRA predictions were summarized and put into a common template to allow easy 
comparison (see Section 2.7).  This summary was done without the assessment team being aware of 
the actual findings from the crews.  After the summaries were completed, the assessment team learned 
of the actual crew performance, and comparisons were made between the findings and predictions.  
This division of labor helped the assessment team to perform the comparisons objectively. In addition, 
the data analysis team in Halden did not see any HRA analyses from the HRA teams before they had 
finished the analysis of the empirical data. These information firewalls helped avoid any impact from 
one part of the study to another.  
 
A minor artifact of the dual nature of the study concerned the timing of the study.  Because the 
analysis teams had not yet been finalized at the time the study was run, it was not possible to have the 
teams observe real crews in the simulator, nor interview crews to answer questions related to factors 
like crew familiarity with the scenario or key aspects of crew operational culture. It is a standard part 
of HRA to allow the analysis teams to watch simulator runs and ask questions of representative crews 
directly [24, 28-29].  In order to compensate for the HRA teams’ lack of such hands-on information, 
the Halden group and the benchmark assessment group developed an extensive information package in 
the study. This package comprised the emergency operating procedures used in HAMMLAB; a 
detailed description of the simulator environment, including a video showing Halden staff acting as a 
crew in a reference simulation scenario; and detailed descriptions of the scenarios, including alarm 
lists and screen-shots from the simulator screens showing key indications at different times of the 
events. Additionally, there was information on the crews and their typical characteristics. The 
information package was followed up by questions and responses from individual HRA teams about 
certain aspects of the scenarios or simulator environment.  All questions and responses were circulated 
to all teams. The advantage of this information package and the question-and-answer round was that 
all HRA teams received exactly the same information. This facilitated control of the analysts’ crew 
and plant knowledge, albeit it might be argued that some HRA methods include mechanisms for data 
collection that others don’t, and some methods need more detailed information than do other methods. 
 
2.2.  Benchmark to Empirical Qualitative and Quantitative Data 
 
As noted, this study consists mainly of a method-to-data benchmark comparison, with the main 
emphasis on how the individual methods matched the empirical data, rather than on how methods 
compared to other methods.  This benchmarking approach deemphasizes trying to determine whether 
one method is comparatively better or worse than another.  The premise of the current study is that 
each HRA method was designed predicated on different assumptions and is optimized to different 
applications.  Thus, a single benchmark is inadequate to rank the relative merits of HRA methods for 
all conditions/applications.  Instead, the benchmark serves as a way to evaluate the HRA methods 
individually in their predictive efficacy for a specific application, but does allow some insights 
regarding strengths and weaknesses of the method. 
 
HRA consists of qualitative and quantitative phases.  Once HFEs have been identified, they are first 
analyzed in terms of those factors that might contribute to the performance failure likelihood.  In most 
HRA methods, this qualitative phase consists of evaluating the context and drivers on performance—
typically in the form of performance shaping factors (PSFs).  After the context and drivers are 
determined, this information is used by the analysts to quantify the HEP.  HRA methods have distinct 
approaches to completing the qualitative and quantitative portions of the analyses.  Some methods, 
such as those associated with root cause analysis, are primarily qualitative.  Other methods, such as 
many of the simplified HRA approaches, do not provide a formal qualitative approach and instead 
only provide a means to quantify the HFE.  For the simplified approaches, it is nonetheless assumed 
that a qualitative analysis will be performed by the analysts prior to quantification.  In practice, the use 
of different qualitative approaches may lead to considerable variability in those HRA methods that are 
primarily quantitative, because two analyses using the same quantification approach may make use of 
different qualitative approaches. 
 
An important lesson learned from the International HRA Empirical Study is the value of considering 
not just quantitative findings in comparing methods to crew performance.  Rather, the study sought to 
capture qualitative factors—both context and drivers on performance—from the crews and the 
methods.  Performing only a quantitative comparison is analogous to doing a math problem without 
showing the work behind the answer.  If the quantitative result doesn’t match the actual data, does this 
mean the HRA method represents a poor analysis tool?  The study revealed cases where HRA methods 
performed a thorough qualitative analysis but did not match the empirical quantitative findings, 
suggesting a potential poor mapping between the methods’ qualitative and quantitative phases.  In 
other cases, methods identified incorrect drivers in their qualitative analysis but had good matches 
between their HEPs and the error rates observed in the operating crews.  In such cases, it might be 
argued that the HRA method arrived at the right quantitative result but for the wrong reasons.  
Whatever the case, the inclusion of both qualitative and quantitative elements in the comparison 
allowed a more complete understanding of the HRA methods’ strengths and weaknesses in predicting 
crew performance. 
 
2.3.  Consideration of Negative and Positive Drivers 
 
The previous section noted the importance of performing a qualitative comparison in the International 
HRA Empirical Study.  A closely related topic is the consideration of both negative and positive 
drivers on human performance.  Early HRA methods tended to weight only the deleterious effect of 
PSFs on performance [30].  Such methods might be seen as subtractive—quantification starts with the 
assumption of nominal performance, whereupon factors that might negatively impact performance 
would be considered and subtracted from the nominal level of human reliability.  Of course, since 
HRA primarily operates in failure space, the subtractive treatment has the effect of increasing the 
HEP—as reliability decreases, the HEP increases.  Many contemporary HRA methods also consider 
the positive effects of PSFs on performance by crediting those factors that might increase the 
likelihood of success.  Such methods might be seen as additive—success-enhancing factors are added 
to the nominal performance, resulting in increased reliability and a lower HEP. 
 
The practical implication of negative and positive PSFs is seen most directly in HRA quantification.  
However, the International HRA Empirical Study revealed the value of such categorization also in 
terms of qualitative insights and comparisons.  While not all HRA methods incorporate both negative 
and positive PSFs, the number was significant enough to warrant the inclusion of both poles for the 
drivers used in documenting crew performance.  In fact, on average across all SGTR scenarios and 
HFEs, a slight positive effect was credited for these drivers: Execution Complexity (meaning the 
difficulty to carry out the task, not diagnose the right course of action), Procedural Guidance, the 
Human-Machine Interface, Work Processes, and Communication [22].  This means, on average, 
evidence suggested that these factors contributed to crew success across the simulator runs.  Individual 
HRA methods may or may not have been sensitive to the positive effects of such PSFs, but there was 
value in comparing all methods according to these drivers.  For example, if a method predicted a 
negative effect for a PSF related to Execution Complexity, the disparity between the method 
predictions and actual performance warranted closer study for the reason behind the disagreement.  It 
must be noted that some negative or positive effects may be difficult to predict for the analysis teams.  
For example, a driver such as Communication, which was observed to be mostly positive across the 
SGTR simulator runs, was noted by analysis teams to be difficult to anticipate given the lack of 
experience the analysis teams had interacting with the specific crews used in the HAMMLAB studies.  
Despite such limitations, this approach of considering both negative and positive PSFs allowed a more 
complete understanding of crew successes and shortcomings than was present in earlier benchmark 
activities, which had focused exclusively on negative drivers. 
 
2.4.  Sample Size 
 
The International HRA Empirical Study featured a relatively large number of crews (14 total for each 
condition), making it possible to study crew-to-crew variability and, to a limited extent, to estimate the 
human error rate for HFEs within the scenarios.  This is especially noteworthy in that the crews 
represented highly skilled control room operators, each comprising a team of the assistant reactor 
operator, reactor operator, and shift supervisor.  A study of this scale for HRA had not previously been 
attempted and represents a positive byproduct of being an adjunct to an existing HRA study. 
 
Having multiple crews allows the observation of possible differences in response paths across crews.  
In fact, the crew operational performance stories provided in [22] highlight clusters of behaviors by 
crews in response to transients.  While the crews stayed within procedural guidance, there was some 
variability in their responses depending on how the scenario evolved and how they interpreted the 
situation at hand.  Previous research in usability and perception [31-32] suggests that five participants 
(or participant groups) marks the point at which a study can expect to find approximately 85% of 
errors that might be encountered for a particular interface or situation.  As the number of participants 
increases, the percentage of errors detected asymptotes to a point of diminishing returns for each 
added participant.  Nonetheless, further research [33] suggests that where individual differences exist, 
there may be advantages in increasing the number of participants.  The International HRA Empirical 
Study demonstrated the value of having a large sample size, in that crew-to-crew variability was 
identified.  This crew-to-crew variability was not unbounded.  In all cases, clusters of crew responses 
emerged, suggesting consistency within crews depending on their diagnosis and subsequent treatment 
of the situation.  
 
The relatively large sample size serves primarily as an advantage to gaining qualitative insights.  A 
representative HRA method [34] suggests that one would expect experienced crews to commit an error 
1 in 100 times while performing a diagnosis task and 1 in 1,000 times while performing an action task.  
These nominal error rates are in line with most HRA methods.  The problem with running an HRA 
study designed primarily for quantitative insights is that it would be necessary to run a large sample of 
participants before one would reasonably expect to see the occurrence of an error.  In the present 
study, task complexity was intentionally manipulated in order to see the effects of increased 
complexity on crew performance.  As such, the complex cases of the study had predicted error rates in 
excess of the nominal error rates.  In fact, when using the timing criteria (see Footnote 1) to determine 
success or failure on particular HFEs, some crews did fail at some HFEs in the complex cases.  Timing 
was not the only contributor to failure. Some failure is not unexpected given the demands of the 
situation and the tight timing criterion.  For these types of HFEs and with 14 crews, such observed 
performance data may be used to arrive at an objective error rate for the crews.  The Bayesian analysis 
performed as part of the analysis shows that the uncertainty bounds are rather narrow when a number 
of crews fail an HFE [35].  It might be argued that these HFEs are not representative of typical PRAs.  
The standard PRA HFEs, as in the base case in this study, feature infrequent failure and large 
uncertainty bounds. In such cases, when the frequency of errors among crews is low, it would take 
considerable crew runs in the simulator before there would be sufficient statistical power to arrive at a 
definitive error rate. 
 
2.5.  Multiple Methods and Multiple Scenarios 
 
While subjective benchmarks of HRA have compared a large number of methods [2-3, 10-12], the 
empirical benchmarks discussed in [13] featured a much smaller collection of methods.  It was 
desirable to include a wider number of HRA methods than had been found in previous HRA empirical 
benchmarks.  As such, the International HRA Empirical Study featured 13 different HRA methods 
performed by 14 analysis teams (one method had two teams).  This specific number of methods was 
not directly by design but rather the happy byproduct of the willingness of many analysis teams to 
participate in the study.  The study design was flexible with respect to how many methods could or 
should participate.  This flexibility resulted in an empirical comparison that featured as many methods 
as several of the previous subjective benchmarks.  This wide-net approach provided a solid cross-
section of methods currently used internationally in HRAs at nuclear power plants. 
 
One possible limitation of the current design is that all HRA methods (with one exception) in the study 
featured only a single analysis team.  As such, it is difficult to generalize the comparison findings to 
the method in general.  In the worst case, the comparison findings may reflect the peculiarities of one 
analysis team and not prove representative of other applications of the same method.  Since there is no 
way to gauge inter-analyst intra-method variability given the makeup of the analysis teams in the 
present study, future HRA benchmarking efforts should attempt to provide more than one analysis 
team per method.  It is not, however, felt that this limitation hindered successful insights into the 
methods in this study.  There were considerable lessons learned about the methods [26] in terms of 
their utility for qualitative and quantitative predictions.  Additional insights on the process were 
documented formally and anecdotally by the analysis teams, allowing the study’s assessment team to 
provide informed discussions on strengths and weaknesses of the individual methods with respect to 
their use in the International HRA Empirical Study.  Further generalization was not attempted nor 
warranted. 
 
Just as one must be cautious to generalize the results of one team’s analysis to an entire HRA method, 
one must take care to consider the specific scenarios that are being analyzed.  The present study 
provided two scenarios—an SGTR and LOFW scenario, along with base and complex case variants—
to allow a representative sample of the types of analyses for which the HRA methods might be used.  
HRA methods were designed for different purposes, and no single scenario is sufficient to gauge the 
merits or limitations of a particular method.  The two scenarios covered in the present study provided a 
good starting point for evaluating HRA methods, but these two scenarios are by no means exhaustive.  
Additional scenarios to span the gamut of HRA activities are a logical extension of the current study. 
 
2.6.  Clearly Defined Human Failure Events 
 
The HFE represents the human activities that are included in the PRA model.  The HFE is the unit that 
is quantified as an HEP.  While an HFE may be incorporated as a simple node in a fault tree or a 
branch in an event tree, the documentation supporting the HFE represents the nexus of qualitative 
insights used during the quantification process.  These insights may be simple to detailed, depending 
on the analysis needs and the level of task decomposition.   
 
HRA methods do not have a consistent level of task decomposition.  This lack of consistency can 
result not only in different qualitative analyses but also different HEPs.  Moreover, the level of task 
decomposition affects the dependency between tasks, which may have a further effect in driving the 
HEP.  The issue is not that different HRA methods necessarily produce different results for the same 
HFE; rather, different HRA methods may decompose the HFE to different levels.  Thus, the 
quantification of the same HFE may entail different assumptions and, to some extent, different 
groupings of tasks across HRA methods.  In other words, because of a lack of a common task 
decomposition framework, HRA methods may not be using the same unit of analysis when producing 
the HEP.  
 
The Ispra HF-RBE [14] demonstrates how central this topic is to HRA.  The benchmark featured three 
phases of analysis to compare HRA methods.  Each successive phase served to further bound the HFE.  
The first phase asked the HRA teams to identify and quantify HFEs.  Because different HFEs were 
identified across methods, it was difficult to compare method results directly.  The second phase 
involved a more explicit definition of the HFEs to ensure the analysis teams quantified the same HFE.  
Even with a commonly defined HFE, there was considerable variability in how analysis teams 
modeled the HFE.  Differences in task decomposition played a significant role in the differences of the 
HEPs for the HFEs.  Some analysis teams decomposed to a finer level, resulting in lower HEPs.  
However, the dependencies between HFEs were not well accounted for in the analyses with finer 
grained task decomposition, resulting in unrealistically low HEP values in the original author’s 
opinion.  As such, a third phase was conducted, this time with an explicit decomposition of tasks and a 
common HRA event tree used in quantification.   
 
In the present study, the HFEs were carefully pre-defined, and clear definitions of the HFEs were 
provided to all HRA teams to ensure consistent analyses.  Providing pre-defined HFEs did not 
preclude the need for a qualitative analysis by each analysis team.  In fact, in contrast to the first two 
phases of the HF-RBE [14], the present study demonstrated consistent analyses across different teams.  
The only issue related to the definition of the HFEs in some cases concerned the use of somewhat 
artificial timing windows for success/failure designation.  Because no objective, published standard 
exists for the proper timing of tasks, there was some variability in the amount of time that the analysis 
teams predicted each task might take.  Much of this variability stemmed from a lack of hands-on 
familiarity of the analysis teams with the crews and the simulator configuration.  This issue manifested 
in the first series of analyses related to the SGTR scenario.  By the second phase of the study, 
involving the LOFW scenario, analysis teams had been briefed on the performance of the crews during 
the SGTR scenario compared to the method predictions.  Analysis teams commented that this 
debriefing served as a helpful calibration of their analyses to actual performance.  Consequently, in the 
later LOFW analyses, the assessment team did not observe significant misgauging of the time required 
by the crews. 
 
2.7.  Common Comparison Template 
 
In the original pilot phase of the study documented in [20-21], corresponding to a single HFE each 
from the base and complex SGTR scenarios, three types of qualitative data were collected for both the 
simulator runs and the HRAs: 
 
1. The method-specific PSFs, 
2. Operational expressions—narratives to provide the context of how the operator actions unfolded, 
and 
3. A comprehensive error taxonomy.  
 
The comprehensive taxonomy [36] was based on the Human Event Repository and Analysis (HERA) 
database system [37-38]. Modifications included the elimination of factors irrelevant to the control 
room simulator study like maintenance factors, balance-of-plant operations, and PSFs related to the 
environment or fitness for duty.  The goal of using the HERA-like taxonomy was to allow a very 
detailed comparison of the factors that influenced the analysis in the application of the HRA methods.  
The identical taxonomy was completed for the simulator data, thus allowing a precise comparison of 
simulator data and HRA method predictions.  Feedback from the HRA teams on using the HERA-like 
taxonomy was mixed [36].  While several teams found the taxonomy useful as a tool to express their 
analysis in a standard format, others found that the taxonomy was not a perfect match to their HRA 
method and preferred the more open-ended feedback of providing the PSFs and operational 
expressions.  The taxonomy also proved time consuming for the HRA teams to complete.  The time 
required to complete the taxonomy is a direct reflection of the number of items in the taxonomy.  It is 
important to note that the taxonomy was designed for retrospective analyses, in which case the 
taxonomy serves as a reference checklist of factors that might have been observed or documented in 
an event report.  The process of considering each item in the taxonomy for a prospective analysis like 
that conducted by the HRA teams adds considerably to the coding requirements and is an application 
for which the taxonomy is not yet optimized [36].  
 
By the second and subsequent phases of the study [22], the HERA-like taxonomy was eliminated from 
the comparison.  Where the goal had been for the HERA-like taxonomy to provide a common 
language by which to make direct method-to-data comparisons possible, this goal was actually 
adequately served by the other qualitative data. In fact, when the method-specific PSFs were 
standardized through expert review to the same drivers used to account for crew performance, these 
drivers became the common language that facilitated the qualitative comparison.   
 
The drivers provided, in a simple form, a roadmap of the thinking behind the analyses and of the 
factors that influenced the crews’ performance.  By weighting the drivers according to a negative, 
neutral, or positive influence, it was possible to see where a method might have systematically under- 
or over-considered the effects of particular drivers compared to actual crew performance.  It was also 
possible to see where a method might not address particular drivers, or where a method considered 
drivers that were not captured through the observations.  The drivers provided a level of detail that was 
well suited for an overview of the method-to-data comparison.  A more nuanced account was 
subsequently found in the operational expression, although it was not possible to translate this 
freeform narrative into a common language.  Thus, a two-tiered comparison strategy emerged:  the 
high-level overview of similarities and differences between the analyses and crew performance was 
possible through the common drivers; a more detailed comparison that was sensitive to the unique 
aspects of the HRA methods and analysis teams was possible through the operational expressions.  
 
3.  Conclusions 
 
Since the data analysis is still ongoing, the above lessons learned on HRA benchmarking represent 
only a snapshot of the International HRA Empirical Study. These lessons learned nonetheless serve as 
a template for how benchmarking studies can be run effectively.  The lessons learned provide 
guidance pertaining to a benchmark in practice (e.g., information to teams, blind study), effective 
study design (e.g., multiple methods and scenarios), and effective analysis (e.g., consideration of 
positive and negative drivers).  Several of these lessons were learned during the study design phase, 
but additional refinements were realized during the course of the study (e.g., the optimization of the 
common comparison language).  With the inclusion of these lessons learned, the International HRA 
Empirical Study marked an improvement over previous benchmarking efforts, leading to greater 
insights into the HRA methods themselves [26].  Further application and refinement of these lessons 
learned will fortify the ability of HRA benchmarks to draw useful conclusions.  Moreover, by 
simplifying the process of HRA benchmarking, the lessons learned provide the roadmap for an 
ongoing empirical research program in HRA. 
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